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We study the relationship between ambiguity (which comes into
the picture since contracts have to be written in natural language), and
contractual incompleteness. The contracting process is modelled as a
signalling game between the parties and the judge, with the contract
a st h es i g n a l . T h ej u d g ei sa s s u m e dt ob eb o u n db yt h ec o n t e n to f
the contract (in as far as it can be ascertained unambiguously). Two
kind of examples are presented: The …rst set of examples shows how
ambiguity can lead to incompleteness. Here incompleteness is a way
of hedging against adverse judgements on the part of an imperfectly
informed judge. The remaining example illustrates a sort of converse
intuition: It shows how incompleteness might lead the contracting
parties to write ambiguous contracts in order to a¤ord a relatively
well-informed judge freedom to enforce the parties’will.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The …rst-generation literature on contracts (for an overview, see Salanié 1996,
or La¤ont and Martimort 2002) took it for granted that the parties to a
contract could communicate any agreement they reached to the instance in
charge of enforcing it. In fact, besides the occasional reference to veri…ability,
the process of enforcement was rarely mentioned. Lately, a growing literature
(for references, see Tirole 1999) has focused on explaining why contracts are
1or seem ‘incomplete’ - i.e., ‘insu¢ciently state-contingent’(Ayres and Gert-
ner 1989), certainly compared to what …rst-generation contract theory would
have predicted. This literature has shifted the emphasis towards the en-
forcement process in attempts to link ‘incompleteness’ to costs of drafting
contracts, describing contingencies, and the like (see, for example, Ander-
lini, Felli and Postlewaite 2001, and Maskin and Tirole 1999, plus references
therein). The present paper is in this line, o¤ering yet another explanation
of incompleteness in terms of the constraints imposed by the enforcement
process. We innovate in that our explanation relies on the constraints that
natural language imposes on drafting contracts.
Natural language is ambiguous, imprecise, vague, etc.(and has to be, for
deeper linguistic reasons that we do not explore, see Pinker 1995, Jackendof
2002, Solan 1993). This makes communication via a written contract very
di¢cult, often leading to ‘obligational incompleteness’ (Ayres and Gertner
1989), i.e., a situation in which the enforcing instance (the judge) is uncer-
tain about the nature of the agreement entered by the parties.‘Obligational
incompleteness’, in turn, feeds back into the written form of the contract
and, of course, into the sort of substantial commitments the parties aim for.
In this paper, we show, via examples, that when imperfectly informed
judges are bound by a contract written in ambiguous language, well informed
parties might prefer to write incomplete contracts.
The intuition behind these examples is simple: Contracts are left incom-
plete as a way to hedge against uncertain enforcement, which results both
from the ambiguity of the language, and from the limited information avail-
able to judges .Note that it does not make sense to write contracts which
condition on enforcement decisions, for who would enforce such a contract?
Attempting to do this would only push the issue one level back, without
actually resolving the key problem: The limited communication possibilities
between the parties and an ill-informed judge.
We o¤er a second set of examples illustrating a sort of converse logic. We
argue that when language is imprecise (thus directly limiting the commit-
ments the parties can enter into), and the judge is well-informed, the parties
might prefer to choose ambiguous or vague formulations. The intuition be-
hind this is that ambiguity a¤ords well-informed judges the discretion to
enforce the will of the parties (which the judges, being well-informed, can
reconstruct without relying on the written contract).
In developing these examples, it is crucial to distinguish between the con-
tract as written object and the commitments entered via that document. To
2do this, we work with a game in which the parties signal their agreement to a
judge via a written, binding contract. The judge then chooses a continuation
game (compatible with the contract) to be played amongst the parties.
This framework is considerably more explicit than others along two di-
mensions: The enforcement instance is an active player; and we describe
explicitly not only the space of possible agreements, but also the space of
possible written contracts. This allows us to di¤erentiate clearly between
the commitments entered by the parties, and the means to achieve those
commitments -the written contract (thus, incompleteness here is a feature of
the commitments entered, while ambiguity and imprecision are features of
the written contract). Drawing this distinction clearly is, we think, crucial;
after all, contract theory is nothing but an exploration of the interaction
between the written contract and the substantial commitments that derive
from it1.
While the examples we present do not amount to a theory, and we cer-
tainly are too ignorant of linguistics to be able to connect in a serious way
with the insights of that discipline2, we do think that these examples help
in delimiting the issues involved, and, at the very least, suggest the outline
of a more thorough exploration into the role of communication via natural
language for the design of contracts.
Relation to the Literature The work nearest to ours is Bernheim and
Whinston 1998. Our arguments share with their paper a basic second-best
1How important it is to draw this distinction clearly can be gleaned from the inconsis-
tent de…nitions of incompleteness that permeate the literature: Sometimes incompleteness
is taken to describe the written contract, sometimes the substantial commitments. So,
for example, some authors describe as incomplete contracts that do not directly specify
what the parties should do in each contingency, but instead only describe a procedure
to decide what should be done after the uncertainty is resolved (e.g., those studied in by
Maskin and Tirole 1999) Note, though, that these contracts commit the parties fully, if
only in an indirect way. Similarly, contracts which optimally specify one and the same
action for a whole range of contingencies, are often considered incomplete (‘endogenously
incomplete’ -see, for example, Segal ?). In fact, such a contract is specifying an action
for each and every contingency (and, by the way, doing this directly) . In contrast, other
authors consider a contract incomplete if and only it does not commit the parties to a
particular course of action in each contingency, (for example, Bernheim and Whinston
1998).
2It would seem though, that conventional linguistics focuses on describing the structure
of language, rather than on studying the relationship between language and the real world.
The latter being the primary concern in this work. See Jackendof 2002.
3‡avor: While they show how incompleteness along certain dimensions might
lead to incompleteness along others, we show how ambiguity might lead to
incompleteness and viceversa. Moreover, our story of how ambiguity leads
to incompleteness fundamentally resembles their story of how incompleteness
leads to more incompleteness. In both papers the parties aim is to secure
additional ‡exibility. On the other hand, there are clear di¤erences: In our
work, the judge can verify all actions by the parties, and has full enforcement
powers. The judge’s problem lies in interpreting the contract accurately, i.e.,
in establishing intent. In their work, the judge is not an explicit player, and
establishing intent is not an issue. These di¤erences explain why we work
with a signalling game, while they work with conventional perfect information
games.
Two papers that model the enforcement process explicitly are Anderlini,
Felli and Postlewaite 2001, and Baliga, Corchon and Sjostrom 1997. The
…rst studies optimal judicial enforcement (void or uphold a contract) when
the parties face a trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives to make speci…c
investments. This trade-o¤ arises because contracts are assumed to be (ex-
ogenously) incomplete (in the sense of insu¢ciently state contingent). The
latter paper takes an implementation approach, and looks at what happens
when the planner herself has to act as enforcer. Following the implementation
tradition, the enforcer is assumed to have limited information. The standard
implementation problem is thus transformed into a signalling game, quite
similar to the one we work with. Besides the fact that these authors are not
concerned with natural language and its peculiarities, two basic di¤erences
between their work and ours are, one, that they look at cheap talk com-
munication (while talk is costly in our setup as contracts are binding), and,
two, that their enforcer pursues an independent objectives (over and beyond
enforcing the most preferred outcome for the participants in the mechanism).
Maskin and Tirole 1999, whose main line of argument, however, is not
directly concerned with the issues that occupy us here, draws attention to
the importance of how contracts are written (the indescribability of certain
contingencies requires that the procedure to determine the actions to be
implemented ex-post be written in a way which does not refer directly to
indescribable contingencies -this leads these authors to introduce a language
formalism of sorts).
Finally, Ayres and Gertner 1989 and Hart and Moore 1999 clarify substan-
tially some conceptual issues. Particularly, the distinction between ‘obliga-
tional complete’ and ‘insu¢ciently state contingent’. As said, the present
4paper is very much about how obligational incompleteness interacts with
incompleteness in the sense of ‘insu¢ciently state contingent’.
2 The Model
We consider a bargaining situation between two parties. As a result of this
bargaining, the parties will enter into agreements which will be ‘coded’ into
written contracts. The exact informational conditions under which this bar-
gaining will take place will vary, and will be described more closely further
down. We will assume that there is an entity in charge of enforcing agree-
ments between the parties (‘the judge’). Though this entity will rely only on
‘written contracts’ in order to ascertain the will of the parties (i.e., will not
observe the agreement directly), it is nevertheless necessary to keep track of
both agreements and written contracts (the reasons for this will be explained
in section ?).
2.1 Reference Game and Agreements
In order to describe agreements and, later on, written contracts, we intro-
duce a so-called ‘reference game-form’ (henceforth, RG). As will become
apparent, this is not the game-form of the game the parties will actually play
(we refer to this latter game as the ‘contracting game’, G - to be described
further down), but just a means to characterize it.
The reference game-form will be one of perfect information. It is conve-
nient to describe the reference game-form in the following terms: For each
party i 2f 1;2g; specify a set of actions Ai: It is assumed that these su¢ce to
unambiguously describe the decisions in a given reference game-form (more
precisely, that every action is described by a distinct symbol). If the reference
game-form is simultaneous, the aforesaid amounts to a full description of the
game-form. If the game-form is sequential, one has to specify a set T of ad-
missible sequences of actions corresponding to paths of play in RG (for the
details of such a formulation, consult, for example, Rubinstein and Osborne
1994).
De…nition 1 Given a RG,a nagreement ® is a set of terminal histories
of RG3.
3Note that agreements are ‘positive’, meaning that only those actions mentioned in
5We adopt the notational convention of expressing ® as a pair of allowable
actions’ sets, one for each party, [®1;®2]; with ®i ½ A: Each such set will
be a string of actions, with individual actions separated by forward slashes
(a logically redundant practice when applied to agreements; not so when
applied to ‘written contracts’, as we shall see). Of course, the actions for
both parties, when combined, must correspond exactly to a set of terminal
histories. We will denote the agreement as a collection of terminal histories
by ®T:
Example: Say RG is given by the following tree,
Player 1
Player 2 Player 2
a b
c d f e
An agreement might be [a;c]: The actions in this agreement add up to
exactly one terminal history, namely, ac.
An agreement that consists of more than one terminal history allows at
least one of the parties discretion to decide his or her course of action, in
the sense that the game-form constructed using the terminal histories in the
agreement will at some stage a¤ord this party a choice of actions. We will
refer to such an agreement as incomplete. Agreements that are made up of
only one terminal history, will be referred to as complete.
Example (cont.):T h e a g r e e m e n t [a;c] is complete. An incomplete
agreement would be [a=b;c=f]: This last agreement is consistent with two
terminal histories of the given reference game-form, namely, ac and bf: The
game-form constructed using these histories looks as follows,
Here, player 1 can choose between actions a and b.
the agreement are allowed. Furthermore, note that while agreements can be speci…ed in
t e r m so fo u t c o m e so fRG (terminal histories of RG), written contracts will be described
in terms of actions. Outcome-based contracts are probably not equivalent to action-based
ones, even when outcomes are described via actions sequences. Of course, if outcomes can
be described directly, these two types of contracts need not be equivalent.
6Player 1




2.2 Written Contracts and Readings
Two crutial aspects of any language are its syntaxis and its semantics. Roughly
speaking, the semantics is concerned with the mapping from language to
meaning, while syntaxis deals with the rules governing how the basic units of
meaning, ‘words’, are combined into sentences. Ambiguity being the focus of
this paper, it is natural for us to concentrate on the meaning aspect. In the
present framework, the issue of meaning turns around the transition from
agreements to written contracts. To achieve this transtion, we introduce a so
called Encoding Device, ap a i r(C;E); where C is a set of codes (a ‘lexicon’),
elements of which will be used to write contracts, and a mapping E : A ! C;
specifying a code (or set of codes) for each action in A (= A1[A2), onto but
not necessarily one to one. Note that the Encoding Device is exogenously
given, a primitive of the model. It is meant to summarize the (‘semantic’)
constraints imposed by Natural Language, and will serve as the driving force
in the analysis of the paper.
Note further that we are not requiring language to be exact, i.e., one to
one. In particular, di¤erent actions can share the same code. When this
happens, we say that the encoding is polysemic (rather than ambiguous,a
term we will use to designate a feature of written contracts).
We now describe how the lexicon will be used for writing contracts. Gen-
erally, let S (B) denote the set of separated strings (i.e., strings with indi-
vidual elements separated by forward slashes); generated from elements of
the set B: Given a speci…c string s 2 S (B),l e tsk denote its kth: element,
k =1 ;:::;n: Abusing notation, let E (Ai) denote all codes associated with
7elements of Ai by the encoding map E: Then S (E (Ai)) stands for the set of
all separated strings generated from E (Ai): Intuitively, S (E (Ai)) describes
the universe of written sentences that might be used to describe behavior by
player i: A written contract will then be an ordered pair of such sentences,
where the …rst refers to player 1’s behavior.
De…nition 2 A written contract is an ordered pair w =[ w1;w2];w i 2
S (E (Ai)):
In linguistic terms, this de…nition of written contract embodies a form
of syntax (syntax broadly understood as a prescribed, meaningful ordering
of words). This order precludes certain misunderstandings. For example,
there can be no confusion regarding whose actions the contract is referring
to. Also, given the separation between individual entries, no confusion can
arise regarding the number of allowed actions. For the same reason, it is
not possible for confusion to result from grouping the symbols making up a
sentences in di¤ering ways (see appendix ? for a relaxation of this feature).
Even though the sorts of confusion that can obtain in going back from
written contracts to actual behavior is limited by such syntactic devices, the
exercise is still far from straightforward. Not surprisingly, given the posited
inexact encoding, it will often be possible to ‘trace back’ the same sentence to
quite di¤erent behavior. In other words, a written contract will often admit
many ‘readings’.
The following de…nition makes this precise,
De…nition 3 G i v e naw r i t t e nc o n t r a c tw,areading of w; r(w),i sa no r -
dered pair of separated action strings, [r(w1);r(w2)];r(wi) 2 S (Ai); each
of the same length as the corresponding written component, such that for each
entry wk
i in that component, the kth: entry of r(wi);r k (wi); belongs to the
counterimage of wk
i under E; i.e.,
r











k=1,w h e r en is the length of wi; denote the set of actions ap-
































In words, this reading of the contract allows one to construct at least one
terminal history of the reference game-form.
De…nition 5 A contract is ambiguous i¤ it has more than one admissible
reading.










is singleton. A contract such that all its admissible readings are complete will
be called a complete contract.
We feel is important to bear in mind that a contract might have both
complete and incomplete readings. Even an incomplete contract in the above
sense might su¢ce to fully commit the parties, as in equilibrium a complete
reading might get implemented. We come back to this point further below.
2.2.1 Example
To illustrate the possibilities implicit in this formalization, we work through
a somewhat more elaborate example. We adopt the convention of using
numbers to describe actions, and letters to codify them.







9Here, A1 = f1;2g;A 2 = f3;4;5;6g; while
T = ff1g;f2;3g;f2;4g;f2;5g;f2;6gg
Say, the encoding function is given by
E (1) = a;E (2) = b;E (3) = c;E (4) = d;E (5) = E (6) = e
Note that the encoding function is polysemic, since actions 5 and 6 are
encoded into the same letter. An agreement might be
[(1=2);(4=5)]
This agreement would allow for three outcomes, f1g, f2;4g and f2;5g: In
other words, it is incomplete. Now, using the encoding above, such an agree-
ment has to be written
[(a=b);(c=e)]
This written contract is clearly both incomplete and ambiguous. It admits
the readings [(1=2);(3=5)] and [(1=2);(3=6)];hence, it is ambiguous. On the
other hand, both readings are consistent with multiple terminal histories,
i.e., both T (f1;2g[f 3;5g) and T (f1;2g[f 3;6g) contain more than one
element, hence, both are incomplete.
Note, though, that, generally, a written contract can be ambiguous with-
out being incomplete, and viceversa. Consider the written contract [(a);(d=e)]:
This written contract is ambiguous, since it has more than one reading, yet
each such reading is complete, and, hence, so is the contract.
Also, there are ambiguous contracts which might admit both complete
and incomplete readings (which, under our de…nition, would be described
simply as incomplete). To illustrate, we need to modify the encoding, letting
nowE (1) = E (2) = a: Under this modi…ed encoding, the written contract
[(a);(d=e)] has the reading [(1);(4=5)]; which is complete; and the reading
[(2);(4=5)]; which is incomplete.
2.3 The Contracting Game
We are now in a position to describe the game the contracting parties will
actually play: This will be an extensive form game between 3 di¤erentially
informed players: Two contracting parties and a judge.
10The general structure will be that of a sender-receiver game (with the
written contracts playing the role of signals, the parties the role of senders,
and the judge the role of receiver). As usual, we model the initial uncertainty
by moves of nature (‘states of the world’), chosen from a set ­; with generic
element !: Nature moves will be observed directly by the contracting parties,
though not necessarily by the judge. In so far, the resolution of ex-ante
uncertainty describes the knowledge of the world the contracting parties have
at the moment of contracting. This knowledge will determine the terms of
agreement between them.
Importantly, we are assuming that ex-ante nature moves are not describ-
able. This is re‡ected in two features of the setup: One, the reference game-
form is assumed to be the same after every nature move, and, two, the
language being used to describe this game-form is also the same regardless
of nature moves. A caveat: As will become apparent, this undescribability
will not drive the results of this paper in any substantial way.
In describing the contracting game further, we distinguish between two
stages: The proposing stage, and the enforcement stage.
2.3.1 Proposing Stage
In what follows, we will reduce the ex-ante uncertainty to two dimensions
which we will think of as ‘summarizing’ the manifold considerations that
might determine the outcome of contractual bargaining : One dimension
refers to the assignment of ‘bargaining power’. Nature will assign ‘bargaining
power’ to either one or the other party, and the party with the bargaining
power will then make a take-it-or-leave-it ‘contractual proposal’ to the other.
The other dimension concerns the payo¤s in the ‘reference game’. Payo¤s
inG will be given by a mapping from the product of ‘states of the world’,­;
and terminal histories in the reference game-form, T,t ot h ep o s i t i v er e a l s ,
ui : ­ £ T ! R
+
Given a state of the world, !0 2 ­; we can de…ne its corresponding ref-
erence game, RG(!0); as being characterized by the reference game-form
RG; and payo¤s ui (!0;:), i =1 ;2:
We will assume that the states of the world display the following structure:
Each state ! 2 ­ will be representable as a pair (b;¼) where b 2f 1;2g
denotes whether player 1 has the bargaining power (b =1 ); or two does
11(b =2 );while ¼ 2 ¦; denotes the payo¤ structure of the given reference-
game form.
The ‘contractual proposal’ will consist of a pair made up of an agree-
ment and a written contract (the reasons for including an agreement in this
proposal will be discussed when we discuss the judge’s objective). If this
proposal is rejected, the game is over and the parties receive a default payo¤
(which will be normalized to zero). If accepted, an enforcement stage follows.
We will require that the agreement and the written contract making up
a proposal are ‘compatible’ with each other. In order to make this precise,
we de…ne ‘continuation game’,
De…nition 7 G i v e naw r i t t e nc o n t r a c tw; and a reading of this contract,
r(w); the continuation game-form under this contract reading, CG(r(w));











Example (cont.): Using the original encoding in the preceding example,
again consider the contract [(a=b);(c=e)]: Take the reading [(1=2);(3=5)]:





Since the reading is incomplete, this continuation game-form is non-
trivial. Note that the continuation game-form corresponding to a complete
reading allows no discretion to the parties.
De…nition 8 An agreement/contract pair is said to be compatible i¤ the
game-form made up of the terminal histories of RG that are consistent with
the agreement is a continuation game-form under some admissible reading of
the contract.
Note that in permitting only compatible proposals, we are implicitly ex-











6= ;; i.e., no admissible reading).
122.3.2 Enforcement Stage
In this stage, the only decision the judge makes is to choose a continuation
game. Once such a game is chosen, parties will be free to play it as they see
…t.
We will assume that the judge, in choosing a continuation game, is bound
by a ‘plain language rule’:
Assumption (Plain Language Rule) Given a contract w; the judge can
choose only amongst continuation game-forms corresponding to admis-
sible readings.
Note that this rule just captures the obvious fact that a written contract
not only binds the parties to a contract, but also the judge enforcing it.
Choosing a continuation game is then equivalent to choosing a reading
amongst all admissible ones. It follows that if w is not ambiguous, i.e., admits
only one reading, then the judge has nothing to decide. On the other hand,
if the contract is complete, then the continuation game-form chosen by the
judge will not allow the parties any choices. Note that the clear language
rule makes it directly costly to choose (written) contracts; in other words,
(written) contracts are not ‘cheap’.
Example (continued): Looking only at the written contract [(a=b);(c=e)],
the judge cannot determine whether e stands for action 5 or action 6: Note,
though, that he or she does know that only one of these is meant. Hence,
the judge has to decide what e stands for, i.e., choose an admissible reading.
Depending on this decision, the allowable terminal histories will be either
f1g and f2;5g; or f1g and f2;6g: In either case, party 1 has a choice of
actions, i.e., the continuation game-forms are non-trivial.
Finally, even though it is implicit in the above, it is worth stating ex-
plicitly that the judge here can, in principle, observe all actions undertaken
by the parties, i.e., that there is full veri…ability -using the terminology of
Bernheim and Whinston ?. Throughout this paper, this assumption will be
maintained. Note that what prevents the judge from forcing the parties to
take certain actions is not his or her inability to monitor compliance, but the
plain language rule.
What does the judge maximize? In choosing amongst continuation
games corresponding to admissible readings, the judge’s objective will be to
13try and implement the will of the parties as accurately as possible4.I t i s
in order to capture this formally, that we introduced a dual proposal above.
The judge observes only one component of the proposal, the written contract,
not so the agreement. Yet his or her aim will be to ‘match the agreement’
between the contracting parties. Speci…cally, the judge obtains an in…nite
payo¤ if the resulting terminal history of the chosen continuation game-form
corresponds to one allowable under the agreement, and a payo¤ of minus
in…nity should the outcome di¤er from one allowable under the agreement.
Note that both the agreement and the continuation game-form are made up
of terminal histories of RG. The requirement of compatibility, on the other
hand, guarantees that there will be at least one continuation game-form
which incorporates the terminal histories in the agreement.
This payo¤s’ speci…cation implies that the judge will be indi¤erent be-
tween choosing continuation games that, in equilibrium, do not lead for sure
to a terminal history (of RG) in the agreement, as well as between continu-
ation games that lead to such terminal histories for sure. In such cases, we
will assume that the judge has recourse to a ‘default rule’,
Default Rule In any equilibrium in which the judge cannot be sure that
choosing a continuation game-form corresponding to an admissible read-
ing will result in a terminal history of RG consistent with the parties
agreement, he or she will randomize evenly in choosing amongst contin-
uation game-forms whose outcomes might correspond with the agree-
ment.
This dual procedure in implementing (private) contracts does seem com-
mon in practice: The judge sticks to the contracts when no interpretative
problems arise. If the latter arise, then judges often have recourse to ‘default
rules’ (‘substantive canons of construction’, ‘rule of leniety’, etc., see Solan
1993, p.66).
The Judge’s Information We will consider situations in which the judge
may not be fully informed along two dimensions: The judge might ignore
who has the bargaining power, i.e., who is proposing. Secondly, the judge
4On the question of de…ning a judge’s objective, see, for example, Posner 1993. That
author takes the view that judge’s maximize ‘the same thing as everyone else’. We feel
that de…ning the judge’s objective is not quite as straightforward. The text hints at the
issues.
14might ignore the exact payo¤s of the reference game being played. Of course,
t h ej u d g ew i l ln o tb ea b l et od i r e c t l yo b s e r v et h ea g r e e m e n tr e a c h e db e t w e e n
the parties, only the written contract ‘embodying’ that agreement. Towards
the end, we will consider brie‡y situations in which the judge has other
information.








CG history  D
Reference Game
Judge’s Payoff = +Infinity
(0,0) (0,0)
Party j accepts or rejects R
A
2.4 Legal Equilibrium
As above, let ­ stand for the set of states of the world (i.e., initial nature
moves), with ­i denoting the states in which contracting party i proposes.
Further, let P denote the set of all agreements, and let W denote the set of
all written contracts. Given a contract w 2 W; we de…ned CG(r(w)) as the













Let CG(w) stand for the set of all continuation game-forms associated with
some admissible reading of w:
Denote by ¾i (r(w)) a strategy of contracting party i (i =1 ;2) in contin-
uation game-form CG(r(w)),a n dl e t§i (r(w)) stand for the set of all such
15strategies. A strategy for contracting party i in the contracting game
G;s i; consists of two mappings, sk
i;k=1 ;2; such that
s
1
i : ­i ! W £ P
s
1
i : ­¡i !f accept;rejectg
s
2
i : W £ P £ ­ ! §i(r(w))
A judge’s strategy, r, is simply a mapping from written contracts to
probability distributions over continuation games,
r : W !4 CG(w)
The judge’s beliefs are given by a mappingª from written contracts to
probability distributions over ­;
ª:W !4 ­
The judge’s beliefs, will, of course, be required to be consistent with the
equilibrium, in the usual manner.
I nt h el i g h to ft h ep o s i t e do b j e c t i v ef o rt h ej u d g e ,t h eu s eo fad e f a u l t
rule, and the assumption of compatibility, it is more economical to describe
the judge’s behavior in the following way: Given beliefs ª and a pair of
strategies si;i=1 ;2, the distribution over states induces a distribution over
agreements. Whenever an agreement is assigned probability one, an optimiz-
ing judge must choose the continuation game corresponding to this agreement
with probability one (such a continuation game exists by compatibility). Else,
the judge has to mix evenly amongst all admissible continuation games -by
the default rule. Note that this behavior does not con‡ict with maximization
of payo¤s on the part of the judge -at least in as far as this maximization is
well de…ned.
De…ne modi…ed beliefs as
e ª:W !4 P
and let the judge follow the behavioral rule





Of course, e ª will again be required to be consistent with the contracting
parties’ strategies.
De…nition 9 A legal equilibrium is a behavioral rule for the judge ±; a
pro…le of strategies for the contracting parties, s; and beliefs e ª; such that the
latter are consistent with ± and s, while the strategies s are optimal under ±.
In particular, the projection of s to any continuation game admissible under
s forms a subgame perfect equilibrium in that game.
3 How Polysemy Leads to Incompleteness
We start out by presenting three examples of how ambiguity might lead to
incompleteness. As it turns out, the examples are less special than might
appear at …rst, and seem to represent the main ways in which ambiguity can
lead to incompleteness.
In all instances we deal with situations in which, roughly speaking, the
parties have too many things to say, but too few words to express them
(explicitly in the …rst example; implicitly in the others). This circumstance
forces pooling in equilibrium (i.e., the same written contract obtains in at
least two distinct states).
In the …rst example, pooling creates incentives for the party with the
bargaining power (i.e., the party proposing the contract/agreement pair),
to include additional actions in the written contract in order to be able to
‘escape’ an eventually erroneous judgment. It illustrates a ‘hedging’ motive
for incompleteness, which we shall argue is speci…c to contracting under
ambiguity.
In the second example we illustrate a self-enforcement motive for incom-
pleteness. The idea being that parties allow themselves some discretion in
order to exploit the informational advantage they enjoy. This form of incom-
pleteness is not speci…c to the type of situations studied here.
In essence, Bernheim and Whinston ? also obtain this sort of incom-
pleteness. However, there are di¤erences. A third example aims to make
17these plain -besides illustrating a special form of self-enforcement based on
coordination in reference games with simultaneuos moves.
3.1 Example 1: Hedging
Assume the judge knows only that the reference game is one out of a contin-
uous set. That is, we will assume that initial nature moves are drawn from a
continuum, and that the judge cannot directly observe those moves (though,
of course, the parties to the contract can). The uncertainty will concern only
the payo¤s that obtain in the reference game. The diagram below illustrates:
A f t e rp l a y e r1t a k e sa c t i o n2; party 2 chooses between a single action (5) and
an interval of actions, all encoded c: Hence, the encoding is polysemic. In
the interval of actions, there is always exactly one action leading to the out-
come (7;5); another to the action (5;7): All other actions lead to the payo¤s
(0;0):The exact location of the two ‘good’ actions along the continuum is











Finally, assume that party 1 has the bargaining power ( the judge is aware
of this assignment).
Trivially, there must pooling in equilibrium, as the cardinality of the set
of possible reference games vastly exceeds that of the set of written contracts
(which are also the potential signals). By the default rule adopted here (see
section ?), the judge, when confronted with a written contract which includes
c, picks an action from the interval randomly. Under these circumstances, it
will be the case that the written contract
[(anb);(c)]
18dominates all others for player 1; while the contract
[(b);(cnd)]
is dominant for player 2:
These incomplete contracts dominate because they allow the players to
hedge against adverse judgments. Should the judge choose the ‘wrong’ ac-
tion, the party proposing the contracting will always be able to ‘opt out’
by taking his or her ‘hedging’ action. Note that incompleteness is the only
meaningful way to do this: It would not make sense to make a contract
contingent on the judge’s ruling, for, who would enforce it? Allowing for
appeals would only push the central issue one level up each time one of the
parties has recourse to a higher court. Eventually, a …nal enforcing instance
(supreme court) has to be reached, and we would be back at the problem as
posed here.
This example brings forth what we think is an interesting linguistic prob-
lem: The issue of pragmatic signalling. We will attempt to de…ne this
notion more precisely further on (though we will not go beyond this in the
main text). For now, let us just say loosely that pragmatic signalling amounts
to ‘cheap-talk’ signalling via ‘redundant statements’. We feel that, in prac-
tice, the scope for such pragmatic communication is extremely limited, and,
hence, in much of what follows we will simply assume it away (for some ex-
amples of why such pragmatic signalling might not be possible even when the
cardinality of the signal space exceeds that of the state space, see Appendix
?). By the way, note this hedging equilibrium is separating (and must be,
see Section ?).
3.2 Example 2: Self-Enforcement
Nature has two moves: One move leads to the payo¤s shown in the diagram
below, while the other interchanges them (leaving the rest of the reference
game unchanged):
19Player 1
Player 2 Player 2
1 2
3 45 6







As before, the parties to the contract observe nature moves, but the judge
does not. Assume that party 2 has the bargaining power, and that this is
known by the judge. Thus, the problem of the judge is just to …gure out which
actions to enforce in order to induce the best outcome for player 2. Note
that the encoding is polysemic. If it were not, despite the judge’s ignorance,
the parties would agree to a complete contract, which would provide the
judge with precise instructions. This shows, by the way, that the posited
undescribability of nature moves does not by itself lead to incompleteness in
this sort of setup (the key feature in this respect is the ex-ante nature of the
uncertainty).
With a polysemic encoding, however, player 2 has to …gure out whether
there is contract that would allow him or her to achieve the best outcome in
all states. Since the polysemic encoding does not allow player 2 to directly
tell the judge which route to follow (the desired terminal history in either
state can only be described by [(a);(c)]), such a contract will have to allow
player 1 some discretion, and, hence, be incomplete. However, if player 1
is allowed discretion, player 2 must have discretion too. For, given that the
judge does not know which history leads to the desired outcome, and since
the polysemic encoding does not allow player 2 to directly tell the judge
which route to follow, the only option for the proposing player is to, in e¤ect,
take over the judge’s role and enforce the right action by player 1 him- or
herself by means of state contingent threats. This can, in fact, be achieved
here, through the following incomplete contract:
[(a=a);(b=b=c=c)]
20The judge will then choose the reading
[(1=2);(4=7=3=6)]
The continuation game corresponding to this reading is non-trivial, and has in
each state the ‘right’ subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium
is fully pooling.
Again, the issue of pragmatic signalling comes up here. For example,
one could, quite trivially, obtain a fully separating equilibrium by having the
proposing party send the contract
[(a);(c=c)]
in the …rst state, and the contract
[(a);(c)]
in the second. Note that both contracts are complete. The second c in the
…rst contract just serves the purpose of signalling the state to the judge.
As we said in the introductory comments to this section, we feel this sort of
communication is rare in the real world. Formally, it would be easy to modify
this example along the lines of example 1 so that the cardinality of the state
space exceeds that of the signals space (the space of written contracts), and
thus exclude full separation.
This example also illustrates some of the subtleties of incompleteness
in this framework. The pooling contract proposed has, besides incomplete
readings, complete ones (unlike the hedging contract in example 1, which
only had incomplete readings). It is the judge who chooses the incomplete
reading, precisely in order to induce self-enforcement. In other words, sub-
stantive incompleteness (i.e., partial commitment) is really a property of the
legal equilibrium, not of the contract itself.
As already pointed out, Bernheim and Whinston ? also o¤er a self-
enforcement explanation for incompleteness (in a model with limited veri…a-
bility though). While essentially the same logic as in their work operates here,
there is a substantial di¤erence: In their framework, one party is granted ad-
ditional ‡exibility because the ‡exibility of the other cannot be constrained.
Here, additional ‡exibility is granted to one party in order to grant additional
‡exibility to the other. The next example illustrates this di¤erence.
213.3 Example 3: Coordination
The reference game is as follows: To start with, the two parties choose be-
tween 2 actions simultaneously. Afterwards, they proceed to play a sequential
game (one and the same game-form, regardless of the outcome of the simul-
taneouous moves). Assume that uncertainty concerns here only who has the













7# # = I,II,III
a  a
The following contract implements the will of the parties in each state,
[(b=b=c=c=d=d);(a=a)]
This contract admits the reading
[(1=2=5I=6II=7IV=6III);(3=4)]























Note that the ‘reduced form’ simultaneous moves game that results has
two Nash equilibria (note, by the way, that these are ‘self-enforcing’ in the
sense of Aumann ?). One equilibrium outcome corresponds the most desir-
able outcome in RG for player 1, while the other corresponds to the most
desirable outcome for player 2. Hence, this contract can implement the will
of the parties in every state.
This example illustrates well the di¤erences with the Bernheim and Whin-
ston approach: The key to incompleteness here is the multiplicity of equi-
libria. If it were not possible to contractually induce a simultaneous game
with multiple equilibria, it would not make sense to allow the parties discre-
tion. In Bernheim and Whinston, in contrast, the parties would not want to
induce multiple equilibria in this fashion. In fact, in their framework incom-
pleteness (appropriately rede…ned to take into account limited veri…ability)
cannot result in static setups, except in cases in which a complete contract
would induce multiple equilibria, and then only as a means to eliminate such
multiplicity, not as a means to exploit it (see Bernheim and Whinston ?,
p.907).
In order to clarify the relationship of the present work to Bernheim and
Whinston ?, we attempt to reinterpret the example just presented in terms
of limited veri…ability. Start by assuming that the judge is fully informed but
cannot distinguish between actions 1 and 2, on the one hand, and actions
3 and 4, on the other. This reinterpretation requires further modi…cations:
It would not seem reasonable to allow the judge to condition ‘downstream’
enforcement decisions on the outcomes of the simultaneous move game, given
that he or she is not in a position to distinguish amongst them (Bernheim
23and Whinston follow this modelling convention, see the discussion on p.908).
Hence, the same ‘downstream’ actions will have to be enforced regardless
of the simultaneous moves outcome. This represents no problem for the
party proposing though: He or she will simply have the judge enforce the
actions leading to his or her best outcome. By doing this, the simultaneous
game becomes trivial. Any outcome will correspond to a Nash equilibrium,
and all will yield the desired outcome for the player proposing. Note that
the resulting contract would be complete, as completeness can here only
reasonably mean ‘as complete as possible’ given the limits of veri…ability5.
We could modify the example further in order to make the reinterpre-
tation less trivial, say by letting the terminal histories leading to the best
outcome for the party proposing vary with the outcome of the simultaneous
moves stage. Since the judge has to enforce the same sequence of actions
regardless of the outcome of the simultaneous moves game, the payo¤s will
now vary across such outcomes. Under these conditions, the party proposing
will aim ideally to select payo¤s yielding a unique Nash equilibrium whose
outcome corresponds to the best possible for this party. Inducing multiple
equilibria would only make it more di¢cult to force coordination on the de-
sired outcome. By the same logic, adding additional veri…able actions (mak-
ing incompleteness feasible) would only lead to incompleteness if allowing
these actions helps eliminate undesired equilibria.
4 Characterizing Incompleteness
4.1 Polysemic Structure
In trying to characterize more generally the conditions under which incom-
pleteness might result, and the form it might take, we will restrict attention
to sequential games (and thus we will not consider coordination incom-
pleteness of the sort illustrated by Example 3). Moreover, we will restrict
attention to sequential games with generic payo¤s , i.e., with no payo¤-
ties. An implication of this last assumption is that, for each state ! 2 ­,
and for each player i; i =1 ;2; there will be one and only one best terminal
5Of course, incompleteness in the broader sense of Bernheim and Whinston ? is un-
feasible in this example. However, it is obvious that even if we were to add an additional
veri…able move for each player at the initial stage (making incompleteness in this broader
sense feasible), things would not change.
24history, denoted by t¤ (i;!) 2 T , i.e., one and only one history such that
ui (t
¤ (i;!);!) ¸ ui (t;!) 8 t 2 T
We do not think any of these restrictions bears on the substance of our
conclusions, and they certainly make the characterizations much less notation
intensive.
De…ne a ‘contractual situation’, GE;C; made up of a contracting game,
G; a n da ne n c o d i n gd e v i c e ,(E;C):We proceed to de…ne what we will call,
for lack of a better name, the ‘polysemic structure’ of such a ‘contractual
situation’, denoted by PG;(E;C): This concept will play a crucial role in the
analysis that follows. Informally, a ‘polysemic structure’ will be a partition
of all terminal histories in RG such that histories in a cell cannot be distin-
guished linguistically, i.e., are all described by the same sentences. To make
this notion precise, de…ne the minimal encoding mapping
Emin : T ! C
2
associating with any terminal history the smallest cardinality set of codes
that can be used to write contracts that can be read as such a history. To
simplify, we will be assuming that the encoding does not allow for synonyms,
thus guaranteeing that this mapping is a function.
De…nition 10 Given a contractual situation GE;C; its polysemic struc-
ture PG;(E;C) will be a partition of all terminal histories in RG,s u c ht h a t ,





This implies that if a history in a cell can be described by the written
statement [w1;w2], all histories in that cell can be described in those terms
as well.
Example: Refer to the reference game and encoding in the example of
section 2.2.1. Assume that uncertainty concerns only who has the bargaining
power, and that terminal history f2;5g is best for player 1, while terminal
history f2;6g is best for player 2. These two histories cannot be distinguished
by means of written descriptions, since
Emin (f2;5g)=Emin (f2;6g)=fe;bg
25Hence the polysemic structure of this contractual situation has four cells only.
De…ne the polysemic structure of the best terminal histories, P¤
G;(E;C);
analogously to polysemic structure, but referred only to the set of best his-
tories as de…ned above.
The following proposition is immediate,
Proposition 11 Incompleteness cannot arise in contractual situations GE;C
whose polysemic structure P¤
G;(E;C) consists only of singleton cells.
4.2 No Incomplete Agreements
The next proposition shows that incomplete agreements are in a sense weakly
dominated in this framework.
Proposition 12 Given a legal equilibrium specifying an incomplete agree-
ment in some state, there always exists a legal equilibrium specifying complete
agreements in all states that generates an equivalent or better outcome.
Proof. Say the agreement ®T (!) is incomplete. If the judge chooses a read-
ing of w(!) with probability one, then the incompleteness of the agreement
is clearly redundant. If the judge mixes, and w(!) is proposed only in this
state, then by dropping those histories in the original agreement that yield
lower payo¤s, while sticking to the original written contract, one obtains
a legal equilibrium specifying only complete agreements whose outcome is
superior (note that in such an equilibrium, the judge will not mix but will
choose the reading that leads to the realization of the agreement). If w(!)
is proposed in more than one state, then dropping dominated histories from
the agreement (while sticking to the original written contract), results in an
outcome-equivalent legal equilibrium (the judge will continue to mix amongst
exactly the same readings as before).
4.3 Pragmatic Signalling
We will de…ne more precisely what we mean by ‘pragmatic signalling’. As
said, our notion of ‘pragmatic signalling’ coincides in essence with the con-
ventional notion of ‘cheap signalling’ in sender-receiver games. The only
complication is that, in the present framework, whether a code is cheap or
not depends on the context in which that code appears.
26The most obvious case of ‘cheap’ communication arises with repeated
codes, either non-polysemic or polysemic (provided the latter are repeated
often enough). The inclusion of such repetitions in any written contract
will leave the readings of that contract as well as the set of terminal histories
associated with any such reading, unchanged. On the other hand, there could
be non-repeated codes in a written contract that, when deleted, leave the set
of continuation games associated with the contract unchanged, though the
readings associated with the resulting contract will change. Such codes we
will call isolated, in as far as the actions associated with them do not enter
into the construction of any terminal history under any reading.
These considerations motivate the following de…nition,
De…nition 13 G i v e naw r i t t e nc o n t r a c t ,redundant codes are those that,
if deleted, leave the set of continuation games associated with any reading of
the original contract unchanged.
We want to strengthen this de…nition somewhat to
De…nition 14 Given a legal equilibrium, equilibrium redundant codes
are those that, if deleted, leave the set of continuation games associated with
any reading chosen with positive probability under the original contract un-
changed.
There is another form of redundancy which we want to exclude as well:
It concerns codes or combinations of codes that only introduce dominated
choices into the continuation games associated with the contract that results
from their deletion.
De…nition 15 G i v e naw r i t t e nc o n t r a c tw, we say that a code item wk
i in
the contract is dominated if there is no reading of this contract such that
an action rk
i (wi) would have been chosen in the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the subgame starting at the point where this action is available, in some
state ! 2 ­.
The following de…nition is a strengthening of the preceding one,
De…nition 16 Given a legal equilibrium, a code item wk
i in wi is equilib-
rium dominated if there is no reading r(w) and associated continuation
game in which the action rk
i (wi) would have been chosen in the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting at the point where this action is
available, in some state ! 2 ­ in which this contract is proposed.
27This can be strengthened further to
De…nition 17 Given a legal equilibrium, a code item wk
i in contract w is
strongly equilibrium dominated if there is no reading r(w) and associated
continuation game chosen with positive probability in some state ! 2 ­ in
which this contract is proposed, and such that action rk
i (w)would have been
chosen in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting at the point
where this action is available.
We can now de…ne ‘cheap signalling’ as follows,
De…nition 18 (Pragmatic Signalling) Given a legal equilibrium, we say
that equilibrium contracts signal pragmatically if they are di¤erentiated across
states only by redundant or dominated codes.
De…nition 19 (P r a g m a t i cS i g n a l l i n gi nE q u i l i b r i u m )Given a legal
equilibrium, we say that equilibrium contracts signal pragmatically if they are
di¤erentiated across states only by equilibrium redundant or strongly equilib-
rium dominated codes.
Clearly, communication via redundant and/or isolated codes represents
an instance of what linguists might call ‘pragmatic communication’. That
is, communication via items that only adquire meaning from knowledge of
the situation in which the communicating parties …nd themselves. Or to put
it di¤erently, communication that does not rely on intrinsic meaning. We
feel the scope for this sort of communication in the sort of situations we are
considering is very limited, and we are quite comfortable in excluding it a
priori. On the other hand, it is equally clear that by excluding any form of
equilibrium domination we exclude forms of communication that do rely on
intrinsic meaning (for example, passive hedging). These meaningful commu-
nication is characterized by having the judge rely on irrelevant statements
in order to infer the state. The irrelevance of these statements is of course
relative: Here they are irrelevant in so far as the actions they describe could
be deleted without altering the outcome of the equilibrium in the continu-
ation games being chosen with positive probability. Of course, deleting the
codes describing those actions would alter the overall outcome as the judge
is making inferences based on those codes. In what follows, we exclude this
form of communication as well, even though it is much less clear to us how
much people rely on such devices in practice.
28Once one excludes strong equilibrium domination, the following proposi-
tion is immediate,
Proposition 20 In a fully separating legal equilibrium, in which no contracts
include strongly equilibrium dominated codes, all contracts are complete.
Proof. Assume the contract admits an incomplete reading. Take an action
in the corresponding continuation game which is not being played in its
equilibrium. Since the equilibrium is separating, the judge will know exactly
which history he or she should enforce in each state. Consequently, the
judge will choose only continuation games which yields this outcome and no
other. Hence this action (or one corresponding to the same code item in the
contract) will not be played. In other words, the code item corresponding to
this action will be strongly equilibrium dominated.
4.4 Hedging
In this section, we try to characterize formally the idea of ‘hedging’ intro-
duced in Example 1 above.
Denote by CG(!) the continuation game made up of the game-form
CG and payo¤s corresponding to state !: Similarly, let w! be the contract
proposed in that state, and ®T (!) be the agreement proposed in that state.
We will denote by tCG(!) the terminal history which obtains in equilibrium
in game CG(!): De…ne the ‘joint’ of a set of historiesT 0 as their highest
common decision node, i.e.,as the node that actions shared by all histories
in T 0: We denote it n(T 0): Finally, we denote the set of codes describing a
set of histories T 0 in a given contract w!,b yw! (T 0):
De…nition 21 A contract w! is hedging if it admits two readings with cor-
responding continuation games CG1 (!) and CG2 (!) such that
CG1 = CG1a [ CG1nCG1a




tCG1(!) = tCG1a(!) 2 ®T (!)
tCG2a(!) 6= tHCG2(!) = tCG2(!) = 2 ®T (!)
A l s o ,i tm u s tb et h a t
tCG2a(!) Á tHCG2(!)
If these conditions are satis…ed, we say that HCG2 (!) hedges against CG2a (!):
Building on this de…nition, we can de…ne more precisely ‘active’ and ‘pas-
sive’ hedging.
De…nition 22 Given an ambiguous legal equilibrium, a contract w! ac-
tively hedges if it is hedging, and, moreover, both readings involved in the
hedging are chosen with positive probability.
De…nition 23 Given an ambiguous legal equilibrium, a contract w! pas-
sively hedges if it is hedging, but CG2 (!) is not chosen in equilibrium.
We can de…ne further ‘direct’ hedging versus ‘indirect’ hedging
De…nition 24 A contract w! is directly hedging if in addition to being
hedging, it is the case that the proposer has the move at the joint between
tCG1(!) and tCG2a(!): Else, we say that the contract hedges indirectly.
Example of Separating, Passive, Direct Hedging:
There will only be uncertainty regarding who has the bargaining power.









30The following is a legal equilibrium: Player 1 proposes the contract
w(1) = [(a=b);(c)] and the agreement ®(1) = [2;3]; while player 2 pro-
poses w(2) = [b;c] and the agreement ®(2) = [2;4]: This equilibrium is
hedging with CG1 (1) = f1;(2;3)g;H C G 2 (1) = f1g;CG 1a (1) = f(2;3)g;
CG2 (1) = f1;(2;4)g and CG2a (1) = f(2;4)g: Here player 1 hedges. Evi-
dently, this equilibrium is separating, and so the judge will enforce the agree-
ment with probability one. Note that code a in w(1) is strongly equilibrium
dominated.
Example of Pooling, Active Indirect Hedging:
There will be only uncertainty regarding payo¤s. For concreteness, say
party 1 proposes. Two reference games are possible:









a b a b
(11,2)
We claim that proposing the contract [a=b] in both states, with agree-
ments ®T (!0)=f2g and ®T (!00)=f4g, and the judge mixing evenly be-
tween the readings [1=2] , [3=4];[3=2] and [1=4], is a legal equilibrium in
which there is active indirect hedging. The diagram below illustrates the
equilibrium:







































This equilibrium is best understood by considering what would happen if
party 1 were to propose a complete contract, say [b]: The judge would still
31resort to the default rule. However, conditional on either of the two states,







411 = 7; as under the proposed equilibrium.
Note that the contract and the equilibrium are incomplete (i.e., in equilib-
rium an incomplete reading is chosen for sure). It is not self-enforcing, as the
outcome does not always correspond with the agreement. It is hedging. To
see this, take, for example, the contract w(!0)=[ a;b]; and the correspond-
ing agreement ®T (!0)=f2g: We have CG1 = f1;2g and CG2 = f3;4g;
with CG1a = f2g and CG2a = f4g: Clearly,
w! (CG1a)=w! (CG2a)=b
Moreover, we have
tCG1(!0) = tCG1a(!0) = f2g = ®T (!0)
f4g = tCG2a(!0) 6= tHCG2(!0) = tCG2(!0) = f3g6 = ®T (!0)
This is a case of active hedging, as the judge mixes, and thus the proposer
gets to exercise the hedging option.
4.5 Self-Enforcement
De…nition 25 A pooling ambiguous legal equilibrium, is said to be self-
enforcing in the pooled states if in each of those states the subgame perfect
equilibria of the continuation games selected with positive probability corre-







for CG(!) 2 CG(!);! 2f !0;! 00g, chosen with positive probability, and
such that at least one continuation game-form is non-singleton.
The main di¤erence between hedging and self-enforcing lies in the fact
that (active) hedging is a response to uncertainty regarding the judge’s choice
of readings, while self-enforcement can obtain even if the judge is certain to
pick a particular reading.
For an illustration, the reader is referred to section ?.
325 Characterizing Incompleteness in Simple Ref-
erence Games
In this section, we specialize our setup even further. The following proposi-
tions are proved for reference games in which only one of the parties chooses
an action, i.e., reference games of the form illustrated below,
Player j
1 2 3 4
Call these ‘simple reference games’. Situations in which the party
proposing is also the party moving in the reference game can be understood
as ‘right to play’ scenarios: The party proposing needs the permission of the
other party to move -hence the need for a contract.
We conjecture that close counterparts of the propositions we present be-
low can be obtained in the more general setup sektched above, though at the
cost of a lot more notation.
We will argue that incompleteness in this environment essentially takes
two forms, (indirect) hedging and self-enforcement.
Proposition 26 With two states, in a legal equilibrium with simple reference
games and complete agreements, in which no contract includes strongly equi-
librium dominated codes, and in which at least one contract reading chosen
with positive probability is incomplete, incompleteness only takes two forms,
hedging and self-enforcement.
Proof. Let the states be ! and !0: Proposition ? implies that the equilibrium
must be pooling (fully, since there only two states). Take an incomplete
contract reading, say r(!); and take an action rk
i (!) which is not played in
the corresponding continuation game CG(!).S i n c et h ec o d ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
to that action is not strongly equilibrium dominated, it must be that there is
33some other continuation game, say CG0 (!) chosen with positive probability
i ns o m es t a t es u c ht h a ta na c t i o ne n c o d e db ywk
i is actually played.
If this happens in the same state as the one we started with,t h e n
two conditions must be satis…ed: First, the judge must be mixing. Second,
either this action is not in the agreement, or, if it is, it must be that the
equilibrium action of the original continuation game is not (since we take the
agreement to be complete). Without loss of generality, assume that it is not
in the agreement (hence the equilibrium outcome of the original continuation
game. CG(!); is in the agreement).
Say the new action should not be preferred by the proposer in that state
to the action that would be played in the corresponding continuation game
should this action not be available. Then assuming that dropping of codes
does not change judges beliefs regarding the agreement in each state, it would
be better for the proposer to drop the corresponding code in this state.
Finally, by de…nition of strong equilibrium domination, it must be that
this other action is either the same unplayed action or an action encoded by
the same code in the contract. Thus the condition
w! (CG1a)=w! (CG2a)
is ful…lled.
Hence, we either have hedging in !.
If the state in which this happens is !0, and only !0, then it must
be that in that state this action corresponds to the agreement. Hence, we
would have self-enforcement.
In fact, in this scenario, it is possible to characterize even more precisely
the form incompleteness might take,
Proposition 27 With only two states, a legal equilibrium with incomplete
contracts and complete agreements can only take the following forms: 1)
If hedging, then there can be at most two continuation games chosen with
positive probability, and each can include at most two actions. 2) If self-
enforcing, only one continuation game will be chosen, and it will include two
actions, with each action being played in the state in which it corresponds to
the agreement.
346 Implications of the Dual Structure of Un-
certainty
The dual structure of uncertainty turns out to be important in explaining the
form legal equilibria might take here. This is particularly interesting since in
our opinion bargaining power uncertainty can be reasonably interpreted as
the primary source of obligational incompleteness in the sense of Ayres and
Gertner ?. If the judge does not know who has the bargaining power, he or
she cannot know what the parties actually agreed to. Uncertainty about the
reference game, in contrast, does not prevent the judge from establishing the
will of the parties, but rather makes it di¢cult for him or her to know how to
implement that will. Still, one can argue that this also amounts to a form of
obligational incompleteness, if of a lower level variety. In any case, these two
forms of uncertainty turn out to have distinct implictions, which we explore
in the next sections.
6.1 Active Hedging versus Passive Hedging
Note that in Example 1 above, the hedging option was exercised with positive
probability in equilibrium (active hedging). This need not always be the
case: The hedging history can serve only to separate states (passive hedging).
The following proposition establishes a connection between bargaining power
uncertainty, separation and hedging.
Proposition 28 In an ambiguous legal equilibrium (i.e., a legal equilibrium
in which in at least one state an ambiguous contract is proposed), in those
states of the world in which at least one party hedges, the contracts will signal
who has the bargaining power, i.e., will at least partially separate.
Proof. Fix an ambiguous legal equilibrium. Take two states, !0 and !00
such that in each the reference game is the same but the party proposing
varies. Assume that the party with the bargaining power in state !0 has a
hedging strategy. Then, it won’t be in the interest of the other party in state
!00 to use that same hedging strategy. To see this, note that these hedging
histories must be associated with a payo¤ for the …rst party higher than the
one that party would obtain in any other outcome in that state, except the
outcomes desired by this player. Any other outcome in that state must cor-
respond to a desired outcome for the remaining party. If the hedging action
35of the …rst player would yield a higher payo¤ for the other player as well, it
would be yielding more than that player’s desired outcomes, contradicting
the fact that it was not included amongst the desirable outcomes to start
with (even though that was feasible, since hedging histories can be described
unambiguously).
Corollary 29 In an ambiguous legal equilibrium, if uncertainty concerns
only the assignment of bargaining power, then the equilibrium must be fully
separating with the contracts di¤erentiated by the hedging action. The hedging
option will not, however, be used in equilibrium.
Proof. From the previous proposition, the contracts must vary according
to whom has the bargaining power. Since the uncertainty concerns only this
aspect, this implies that the equilibrium must be fully separating. In such
an equilibrium, the judge will enforce the desired outcome with probability
1, and there won’t be a need to exercise the hedging option
Note that passive hedging represents a form of equilibrium pragmatic
signalling. The hedging statement is equilibrium dominated, since in the
reading selected in equilibrium the hedging decision is dominated.
Corollary 30 The existence of payo¤ uncertainty is a necessary condition
for active hedging.
Proof. From the previous corollary, if there is no payo¤ uncertainty a hedg-
ing equilibrium will be fully separating. If the equilibrium is fully separating,
the hedging option will be super‡uous. Generally, full separation voids the
need to exercise the hedging option.
6.2 Obligational Incompleteness and Self-Enforcement
Proposition 31 In an ambiguous legal equilibrium, a contract cannot be
self-enforcing across states which only di¤er by who has the bargaining power.
Proof. In each pooled state the desired outcome of the reference game will
vary but the reference game itself will not, since uncertainty refers only to
bargaining power assignment. As the reading chosen will be the same in all
pooled states, the associated continuation game will be the same as well. The
continuation game played being one of perfect information with sequential
moves and generic payo¤s, must have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
H e n c e ,t h eo u t c o m em u s tb et h es a m ei na l lp o o l e ds t a t e s
36Corollary 32 If the uncertainty concerns only the assignment of bargaining
power, a legal equilibrium cannot be self-enforcing.
This result is interesting, in our view, because, broadly speaking, ‘self-
enforcement’ incompleteness is the only form of incompleteness that can arise
in Bernheim and Whinston ?. If one accepts the interpretation identifying
obligational incompleteness with bargaining power uncertainty, this propo-
sition supports the view that obligational uncertainty generates a distinct
form of incompleteness, namely, hedging incompleteness (which clearly can-
not obtain in Bernheim and Whinston ?).
The preceding results have a stronger implication still,
Corollary 33 In an ambiguous legal equilibrium, with only bargaining power
uncertainty, incompleteness can only take the form of (passive) hedging.
Proof. If incompleteness takes the form of hedging, by proposition ?, the
hedging must be passive and the equilibrium must be fully separating. If
the equilibrium is fully separating then the judge will know which history to
enforce, and there will be no need for discretion
In other words, there might exist equilibria which display incompleteness
beyond hedging, but they will have the same outcomes as the pure hedging
arrangement (i.e., they will involve some form of pragmatic signalling).
7 Incompleteness Leading to Ambiguity
We illustrate a sort of converse to the logic underlying the previous examples:
When complete contracts cannot be written, or only so at enormous expense
(the reasons for this will be discussed below), parties might prefer to use
ambiguous formulations, even should unambiguous ones be available. This in
order to a¤ord a well-informed judge the freedom to enforce their preferred
actions (which, due to the exogenous incompleteness, they cannot enforce
directly).
7.1 Imprecision
One reason it might be impossible to fully specify the appropriate actions
under every contingency is if written language is inherently imprecise. In
order to capture this notion, it is necessary to generalize the description of





C is a set of codes. The mapping e E though goes now from the power set of
A; rather than just A; into C;
e E : A
2 ! C
De…nition 34 (Imprecision) Ac o d ec 2 C is imprecise i¤ not all a 2
e E¡1 (c) are singletons.




is imprecise if there exist actions
in A that can only be described using imprecise code.
Note that code can be precise but ambiguous ( e E¡1 (c) is made up of
singleton sets); imprecise but not ambiguous ( e E¡1 (c) consists of only one
non-singleton set); and, of course, imprecise and ambiguous ( e E¡1 (c) consists
of more than one set, some non-singleton).
In fact, this extension allows us to draw even subtler distinctions. In
particular, it allows us to de…ne a notion of vagueness (for discussions of this
concept, see Keefe and Smith 1999).
De…nition 36 (Vagueness) Ac o d ec is vague if e E¡1 (c) consists of more
than one set, some non-singleton, and the intersection of at least two of those
is non-empty.
7.2 Example of Imprecision Leading to Ambiguity
The reference game is as follows: The two parties to a contract must each
choose an action. Each such action is represented by a point on the unit
interval. Player 1 moves …rst; player 2 second. Party 1 preferred action pair
is fx;xg: When player 1 plays x; it is best for player 2 to play the action
furthest away from x. Assume that player 1 has the bargaining power.
Language imprecision is modelled by assuming that a contract can only
specify intervals of actions, i.e., that it can only partition the unit interval
…nitely. In terms of the formalism we work with here, for all c 2 C=d;
e E
¡1 (c)=[ a(c);b(c)]
where for no c; a(c)=b(c):
38One convenient way to represent such contracts is to specify that written
descriptions of actions can at most include a …nite number of decimals, zeros
included (to describe an action accurately one would need an in…nite number
of decimals).
Note how the ‘clear language’ requirement applies: The judge will read
such imprecise statements as incomplete, not as ambiguous. That is, he or
she would read them as descriptions of intervals, not as one word which refers
to any one but only one action in the interval.
On the other hand, assume there is a fully ambiguous expression which
might refer to any action of player 2 (something like ‘the appropriate action’
or the ‘expected action’). Formally, there exists a d 2 C such that
e E
¡1 (d)=A2
Finally assume the judge knows player 1 has the bargaining power. The
judge can moreover enforce any action pair he or she chooses subject to two
conditions: The …rst, a rather obvious one, is the existence of a contract6.
The second, a clear language requirement.
It is immediate that player 1 w o u l dp r e f e rt ow r i t eac o n t r a c tw h i c hr e -
quires 2 to take an ‘appropriate action’, rather than one which is unambigu-
ous but incomplete. The judge, being fully informed, will then be entitled to
force 2 to play 1’s favorite choice.
One can easily endogeneize imprecision by introducing costs of writing,
so that even when a precise and unambiguous language is available, parties
prefer to resort to ambiguous expressions. This could be done, for example,
by introducing a post-contracting move by nature that results in one of a
continuum of states, with the preferred actions varying with the state (as is
commonly done in the indescribability literature, see, for example, Anderlini
and Felli 1998).
Note …nally that the standard justi…cation for incompleteness, non-veri…ability,
cannot be invoked here. It is essential in the example that the judge is well
informed and can enforce fully.
6In practice, it is clear that without a written contract, or some evidence of the existence
of a contractual relationship, a court will not intervene. Theoretically, one could capture
this by assuming that contractual parties meet randomly, and the judge has no way of
telling whether the parties met, other than the written contract.
397.3 An Example of Imprecision Leading to Vagueness
The reference game is as follows: There are two contracting parties, plus
nature. The state of nature (nature’s move) is realized after contracting, and
corresponds to a point in an interval [1;2]: The judge knows who has the
bargaining power (say, party 1), but cannot observe nature moves fully. He
can only tell whether nature’s move is in [1;1:5] or in (1:5;2]: Party 1 has
no moves, besides proposing, while party 2’s moves correspond to points in
the unit interval [0;3]: The action of party 2 that maximizes party 1’s payo¤
varies continuously in [1;1:75] with states of nature in [1;1:5]; and in [1:25;2]
with states of nature in (1:5;2]. The maximum payo¤ for party 2 is located
at 2 for states of nature in [1;1:5]; and at 1 for states of nature in (1:5;2]:
Party 2’s payo¤s attain a local maximum at the maximum payo¤ for party
1. The encoding device (‘language’) available to the parties is the following:
There is an imprecise but unambiguous code for 2’s actions, c2; such that
e E
¡1 (c2)=A2 =[ 0 ;3]
There is another code, c2a; which is vague: e E¡1 (c2a)=f[1;1:75];[1:25;2]g:
It is not di¢cult to see that party 1 would prefer using the vague code. In
this case, the judge could rule that party 2 has to take an action in [1;1:75];
whenever the state of nature is in [1;1:5]; and one in [1:25;2] whenever the
state is in (1:5;2]: This would lead party 2 to take the action that maximizes
her utility locally, thus maximizing party 1’s payo¤.
The vaguely formulated contract allows party 1 to exploit both party 2’s
and the judge’s information optimally, while still committing the other party.
7.4 An Incomplete Language?
In all the previous examples, the party proposing the contract has been fully
informed. Clearly, this party has an incentive to convey all its information
to the judge, yet we have implicitly assumed that he or she is unable to do
so, i.e., he or she cannot simply ‘state’ the state of the world in the contract.
The issue of pragmatic signalling, at least in part, boils down to this question
as well; pragmatic signalling being just an indirect way of stating the state
of the world.
The question is then if our examples are just an artifact of language being
incomplete; of a too narrow view of language. The languages we have used
focused on describing the contracting parties actions, and lacked codes to
40describe nature’s moves. We feel that this is just an apparent problem: Pre-
sumably such language would also be imperfect (i.e., ambiguous, imprecise,
etc.), and we conjecture one could construct examples similar to the ones
presented here even when such a wider but imperfect language is available7.
8 Conclusions
We have presented a series of examples illustrating how ambiguity might
lead to incompleteness, and how incompleteness (more precisely, imprecision)
might lead to ambiguity. The …rst link obtains as hedging against uninformed
enforcement; the second, as a way of relying on a well-informed judge to …ne
tune the parties’ commitments.
Though it is, of course, risky to draw broad conclusions from a few exam-
ples aiming at illustrating possibilities, the ones presented here do suggest a
pattern: When judges are well informed, contracts will tend to be more am-
biguous, the parties retaining much less discretion vis-á-vis the judge; while
contracts that are to be adjudicated by relatively uninformed judges will tend
to be more ‡exible, i.e., incomplete, as the parties try to keep their options
open8.
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42A Pragmatic Signalling
In this appendix, we present two additional examples, which show how ambi-
guity might lead to incompleteness. They o¤er increasingly elaborate stories
to justify the existence of pooling equilibria. In linguistic terms, the issue
is one of pragmatic versus ‘verbal’ communication: Why is language com-
binatorial? Why is there not a word or code for each meaning? In game
theoretic terms, this deeper question translates into one of pooling versus
separation. Why can’t the parties to a contract signal the state of the world
to the judge via the contract? The basic answer we o¤er (example in section
?) is, from a game-theoretic point of view, trivial: The cardinality of the
signal space is assumed smaller than that of the set of states of the world.
Yet, linguistically, it is not absurd. As Humboldt put it, “language makes
in…nite use of …nite media”9.
In these additional two examples, we move away somewhat from this
basic scenario, and provide various (‘pseudo-linguistic’) stories which could
explain why, even when the cardinality of the signal space exceeds that of
the set of states, it might yet prove impossible to signal pragmatically.
A.1 Example A: Enough Words, but Compromising to
Say Them
In the previous example, the point of making the cardinality of the set of
possible reference games exceed that of the set of written contracts, was to
prevent what we call ‘cheap-talk’ signalling. ‘Cheap-talk’ signalling amounts
to meaningless communication, or ‘pragmatic’ communication: The judge
infers the state of the world from knowledge of the equilibrium via contracts
whose meaning does not di¤er in any substantial way, but which he or she
can nevertheless di¤erentiate (for example, through redundant statements).
From daily experience, it is obvious that the reach of such pragmatic commu-
nication is limited (certainly between a judge and the parties to a contract),
though the reasons for this are not quite as obvious. One possible answer
is the one suggested above, namely, that the uncertainty is just too large
relative to the communication possibilities. Here, we present an alternative
h y p o t h e s i s :E v e nw h e nt h ec a r d i n a l i t yo ft h es e to fc o n t r a c t se x c e e d st h a t
of the possible states of the world, the fact that talk is not cheap, i.e., the
9Quoted in Pinker 1995, p.84.
43fact that the judge is bound by what is said in the contract, might su¢ce
to induce pooling (and, hence, incompleteness). A caveat: The example is
rather ad-hoc, and we present it to illustrate an underlying logic which we
think will apply in more realistic cases as well.
Assume there are two possible reference games, and that the judge cannot



















The encoding is given by
e(1) = a;e(2) = b;e(3) = e(4) = c;e(5) = d
In addition, the judge does not know ex-ante which party has the bar-
gaining power. Hence, there are 4 states of the world, which we will denote
(j=i);j ;i2f 1;2g; with the …rst number denoting the reference game, while
the second denotes the party who proposes the contract.
Finally, add a ‘syntactic restriction’:
De…nition 37 In a well written contract, code cannot be repeated.
44Despite this last restriction, the number of written contracts remains
larger than the number of states, so that, in principle, the parties could
pragmatically signal the state to the judge. If contracts were ‘cheap-talk’,
the party proposing the contract would not have incentives to mislead the
judge (and, under Farell 1993’s neologism proof re…nement, the only equi-
librium would be separating). The example below shows that, in contrast,
when the judge is bound by the content of the contract (the ‘clear language’
requirement), pooling can nevertheless result. To see this, note that in order
to be able to reach their most preferred outcomes both parties would want to
include the actions b and c: O fc o u r s e ,i fb o t hp r o p o s e dt h i ss a m ec o n t r a c t ,
pooling would result, and assuming that the ‘default rule’ assigns positive
probability to all admissible actions in such eventuality, incentives to hedge
would lead the parties to want to make the contract incomplete by adding
their respective hedging options. Note though that no party would want to
add the hedging option of the other: This would prevent them from getting
their most preferred outcome even should the judge rule in their favor. In
conclusion, only three contracts are really ‘good’ for pragmatic signalling,
namely,
[(a=b);(c)];[(b);(c)];[(b);(c=d)]
But there are four states, so that pooling is inevitable. The conclusion is
that party 1 would strictly prefer to propose the contract
[(a=b);(c)]
while party 2 would strictly prefer to propose the contract
[(b);(c=d)]
The role of the ‘syntactic restriction’ should be clear: It is introduced to
prevent the parties from using redundancies to communicate pragmatically
with the judge. We believe that some such syntactic restrictions operate in
practice. We doubt that a judge confronted with a totally nonsensical con-
tract would ever enforce it, even should he or she feel she can reconstruct the
will of the parties from his or her knowledge of the contracting environment.
The identi…cation of realistic syntactical restrictions that might force this
sort of outcome is, evidently, outstanding.
45A.2 Example B: Trade-O¤ Between Syntactical and
Lexical Ambiguity
The intuition behind the example presented here is simple: Often adding
redundant statements only serves to ‘muddle’ the original message. In order
to capture this intuition, we weaken the assumption that the judge is free
to interpret the contract. We assume that the judge can only interpret the
lexically ambiguous portions of the contract, i.e., ambiguous words. On the
other hand, in interpreting syntactically ambiguous parts of the contract,
i.e., statements in the contract which can be read in di¤erent ways, and,
hence, lead to di¤erent interpretations, the judge cannot rule out any of the
continuation games that might result from di¤erent readings. We will refer
to this as a ‘strict letter-of-the-contract’ requirement. While, again, this is
rather ad-hoc, it does not seem completely unreasonable. After all, there
is quite a lot of evidence that judges do not interpret contracts consistently
(see, for example, Solan 1993).
Now, syntactical ambiguity cannot result under the syntaxis implicit in
the previous examples. That syntaxis distinguished clearly between the ac-
tions of both parties (by means of a dot-colon), as well as between the indi-
vidual actions of each party (by means of a forward-slash). These are the only
dimensions along which syntactical ambiguity might result. In the present
example, we will drop both these features, and assume that the contract
consists simply of string of letters, following an alphabetic order -regardless




If there is an action of party 1 (say) denoted ab as well as one denoted
a; and another denoted b;(but there is only one action denoted c,a n dt h i s
action corresponds to party 2), the judge, when confronted with the contract





46This sort of syntactic ambiguity is of no consequence for party 1; as it just
gives him or her extra freedom. Assume now, though, that ab is an alternative
designation for action d of party 2. In such case, the syntactic ambiguity
becomes a real problem for party 1: It means that this party will never be
able to enforce his preferred outcome.
Now, it is easy to modify the previous example along the lines just
sketched so as to exclude signalling through redundant statements: Specify













e(1) = fbb;cc;dd;ag;e(2) = b;e(3) = e(4) = c;e(5) = fd;aa;cc;bbg
Note that we are allowing here for synonyms -i.e., the encoding is a corre-
spondence.
The contracts [abc] and [bcd]; while lexically ambiguous, are not syntacti-
cally ambiguous. Hence, the judge is free to interpret them fully (i.e., restrict
the parties to play one of the admissible continuation games). On the other
hand, any contract containing repeated codes is syntactically ambiguous as
well. Since any such contract can be read so as to allow the hedging action of
the opposing party, the parties will strictly prefer to propose a syntactically
unambiguous contract. Since there are only 3 such contracts ([abc], [bcd] and
[bc]), this will prevent fully pragmatic communication, and, hence, separa-
tion. Pooling, in turn, will lead the parties to strictly prefer the incomplete
contract that includes their hedging action ([abc] or [bcd])t ot h ec o m p l e t e
contract [bc]:
47A.3 But all this complete?!
Here is an example that shows that other forms of incompleteness can result:
Assume that there is uncertainty about payo¤s only. Say party 1 has the





In a legal equilibrium, party 1 might propose the contract [a] in both
states. The judge will not be able to infer the state, and so will choose each
of the two possible readings randomly. Note that an equilibrium in which
party 1 proposes [(a=a)] in one of the states, and [a] in the other, would
entail equilibrium pragmatic signalling. Of course, the outcome of such an
equilibrium would be superior, since the judge would choose the right action
in each state. Either equilibrium is neither self-enforcing nor hedging.
48